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PLEADING
THE CONCEPT OF A CAUSE OF ACTION - PROPERTY DAMAGE
AND PERSONAL INJURY FROM A SINGLE TORT
Within the meaning of the rule against the splitting of causes of
action, what constitutes a cause of action? Is a caue of action a fixed
and inflexible concept, or can it be adapted to the purpose for which it is
being used? To illustrate the problem, one situation will be considered;
that of property damage and personal injury resulting from a single tort.
In Ohio the case of Bilakan v. The Columbus Railway and Light
Co., io Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 561 (i9io), appears to be the first case on
the point. Here, on a motion to separately state and number the causes
of action, the court held that personal injury and property damage
resulting from the same tort constituted one cause of action. This seems
the more desirable rule under the circumstances. It simplifies the plead-
ings, as the plaintiff is only required to state the facts constituting the
cause of action once.
Later the case of Le Blond Schacht Truck Co. v Farm Bureau
Mutual 4utomobile Ins. Co., 34 Ohio App. 478 (1929), came before
the Court of Appeals. In this case the insured's automobile was demol-
ished in a collision with defendant's truck. The insurer, under a policy
containing a subrogation clause, paid the insured for all damages to the
automobile and took a bill of sale therefor. After the insured had
recovered judgment for his personal injuries, the insurer brought suit
for damages to the automobile. Prior to this the case of Cox v. Traction
Co., 32 Ohio C.A. 487 (1922), had held that under the real party in
interest statute one who has suffered an injury and has been fully
indemnified by a liability insurance company cannot prosecute an action
against those who caused the injury, but that such action must be brought
in the name of the subrogated insurer.
The court in the Le Blond Schacht case found itself in an awkward
situation. If the concept of a cause of action adopted in the Bilakan case
were rigidly applied, the only party who could sue would not have a
cause of action. The prior suit by the insured would be res adjudicata
to the insurer's cause of action and the insurance company's claim would
be barred. Rather than reach this very undesirable result the court
modified the concept of a cause of action so as to accomplish justice in
the particular case, and held that there were two causes of action in this
situation. Thus it will be seen that in this situation the court adopted
a concept of a cause of action to work the best results under the facts
in question, and did not think of a cause of action as an inflexible stand-
ard to be applied arbitrarily under all circumstances without regard to
the end to be achieved. The above case was followed upon identical
facts in North River Ins. Co. v. Redman, 16 Ohio Abs. 516 (1933),
and Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. State Auto Ins. Co., 17 Ohio
Abs. 419 (1934).
The question was presented on a different state of facts in Mayfield
v. Kovak, Jr., 41 Ohio App. 310 (1932). The plaintiff had suffered
personal injuries and property damage from a single tort of the defend-
ant. Plaintiff first filed a petition in the common pleas court against the
defendant for personal injuries and later, while that case was pending,
began action in the municipal court against the defendant for the prop-
erty damage. The latter case was tried and judgment entered in favor
of the plaintiff. The defendant then filed an amended answer in the
common pleas court case, claiming that the judgment in the municipal
court was res adjudicata. The court held that under these circum-
stances there was only one cause of action; but that the defendant would
be held to have impliedly consented to a splitting where two actions are
brought and he fails to object to the trial of the second action at the
earliest opportunity, and submits the case upon the merits.
Interpreting the case from a legislative viewpoint, the court is hold-
ing that there is one cause of action here, but the effect of their holding
is that, unless the defendant promptly objects to the bringing of the
second suit, there will be two causes of action. The holding in the case
seems desirable. The court refused to permit the defendant to sit back
and allow the plaintiff to recover on his second cause of action without
making any objection, and then, as soon as judgment is rendered, to take
advantage of the mistake of the plaintiff's lawyers and defeat the plain-
tiff's claim by a plea of res adjudicata.
The latest Ohio case is lVilmer v. Vail, 22 Ohio Abs. 605 (1936),
in which an action for property damage was brought and the plaintiff
sought to amend after the statute of limitations had run and to include
a claim for personal injuries suffered from the same act of negligence.
The court held that a single tort which causes personal injury and
property damage to an individual gives rise to but one cause of action.
Here also the court reached a desirable result by holding there was
one cause of action. The defendant was put upon notice by the bringing
of the suit for property damages. He would not have to prepare any
new evidence and would not be prejudiced in any way by allowing the
amendment after the statute of limitations had run. On the other hand,
if the court had held that there were two causes of action under the
circumstances, the plaintiff's right to damages for the personal injury
would have been barred.
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As will be seen from the foregoing cases, the courts have not re-
garded a cause of action as a fixed and inflexible concept to be applied
inexorably in every instance, but as a concept that can be modified so
as to reach the most desirable result upon the facts before the court.
It is submitted that the concept of a cause of action should not be re-
garded as fixed and unyielding to be applied strictly under all circum-
stances, but as flexible and elastic to be modified so as to achieve the
most desirable results under the facts of the case in question.
ROLAND A. ZACHMAN
ELECTION OF REMEDIES - REPUDIATION OF ELECTION DOC-
TRINE IN AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS - INTERPRETATION
OF SECTION 11363, OHIO GENERAL CODE
Plaintiff recovered judgment in an action for breach of a contract
to deliver certain stock. The case was reversed by the Court of Appeals
and remanded for a new trial. Plaintiff then filed an amended petition
alleging substantially the same set of facts as the original petition, but
added that defendant had failed to perform its agreement to deliver the
stock and that thereafter plaintiff rescinded the contract and demanded
that defendant return the money which had been paid. Defendant filed
a motion to strike the amended petition from the files on the ground
that it set up a different cause of action from that stated in the original
petition. Held, that in the light of all the circumstances, there was no
prejudicial error in overruling the motion, Isaac v. Intercoast Sales
Corp., 132 Ohio St. 289 (1937).
Defendant's contention was that the amended petition represented
a new cause of action and that there had been an election of remedies
by plaintiff when he filed the original petition. The court stated that
the principle running through all of the decisions is toward liberality in
amending pleadings in the furtherance of justice, especially where the
facts are the same and where the amended pleading does not catch the
defendant by surprise. It was pointed out that the prayer and essential
facts of the original and amended petitions were the same, as was the
defense in both trials, namely, that the stock had been delivered by
defendant. Defendant knew that plaintiff wanted his money back for
the reason that he had never received the stock, and plaintiff knew that
the defense of defendant would be that it had delivered the stock. Since
each side knew what the position of the other side was, the court thought
that defendant was not caught by surprise by the filing of the amended
petition.
